This paper examines how domestic, foreign, private and public investments affect income-inequality through financial intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. With the exception of financial allocation efficiency, financial channels of depth and activity are good for the poor as they diminish estimated household income-inequality. Financial size does not have a significant income-redistributive effect. Financial allocation efficiency has a disequalizing effect on income-distribution; implying policies designed to improve the allocation of mobilized funds to economic agents only benefit the rich to the detriment of the poor. The use of financial and investment dimensions previously missing in the literature provide new insights into the two contrasting theories in the finance-inequality nexus.
Introduction
Poverty and inequality undoubtedly remain important challenges to economic and human developments. Over the past three decades, investment rates have fallen considerably in majority of African countries (Ndikumana, 2002) . This decrease in investment is a major cause for worry, given the close connection between the level of investment and the rate of economic growth (Barro,1991; Ben-David, 1998) . Financial repression and its pervasiveness of stifling economic growth have been elaborately covered by a substantial bulk of literature ( McKinnon, 1973; Shaw,1973) . In the 1980s and 1990s, most African countries embarked on a series of structural and policy adjustments in the financial sector as part of economic reforms with the goal of given impetus to economic growth as well as improving overall economic and financial efficiency (Janine & Elbadawi, 1992) . Hitherto, owing to scarcity and lack of relevant data on income-inequality for Africa, only two studies to the best of our knowledge have addressed the finance-inequality nexus in the continent (Kai & Hamori,2009; Batuo et al.,2010) In the light of the above points, drawing from the experience of a continent that has been implementing development financial reforms, this study aims to assess the income-redistributive effects of investment through financial intermediary channels of depth, efficiency, activity and size in Africa. In particular, the paper seeks to investigate how financial development impacts income-inequality, conditional on domestic, foreign, private and public investments. The main contributions of this work to finance and economic literature are the following: (1)an assessment of why income-inequality in Africa has remained stubbornly high, in spite of more than two decades of economic and financial reforms; (2) contrary to mainstream finance-growth literature this work improves the employment of financial indicators by using financial intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size in the assessment of the impact of finance on income-inequality; (3) we innovate the income-finance literature by introducing a previously missing investment dimension into the debate, where-in the inequality-finance nexus is contingent on aggregate domestic, foreign, private and public investment dynamics.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 discusses existing literature. Data and Methodology are described and outlined in Section 3 respectively.
Empirical analysis and discussion of results are reported in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5.
Existing Literature

Theoretical highlights
A bulk of empirical research has given substantial support to the view that financial development has a significant effect on the pattern of income distribution, more precisely that it either reduces or enhances inequality depending on theoretical postulations. Hence two strands of theories have been developed that provide contrasting views on the income-redistributive impact of finance .
Some protagonists posit an inverted U-shaped link between financial development and inequality. For instance, Greenwood and Jovanovic(1990) study on the finance-growthinequality nexus predicts a Kuznets curve relationship between finance and inequality. In the early stages of development, when the financial sector is underdeveloped, inequality augments with financial development. Conversely, this positive impact on inequality reduces as the economy develops ; moving to the intermediate phase and then to the mature phase of development where-in agents would see their incomes increase as they gain access to the financial intermediary sector. In plainer terms, in the transition from a primitive slow-growing economy to a developed fast growing one, a nation passes via a stage in which the distribution of wealth across the rich and poor stretches.
On the other hand some authors suggest a linear relationship between financial development and income-inequality (Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Galor & Zeira, 1993) . Their basic theoretical assumption is that financial market imperfections such as financial asymmetries, transaction and contract enforcement costs could be very binding on the poor who are deficient of the collaterals, credit histories and relational networks. Thus, even when the poor have projects with high returns, they may still be credit rationed, which infringes on the efficiency of capital allocation and limits the social mobility of the poor. Under these circumstances, income inequality rises with financial development. Conversely, increasing capital allocation efficiency would reduce income-inequality by facilitating funding to the poor individuals with productive investment.
Finance and inequality
The relationship between finance and inequality can be classified into three main strands.
The first strand explores the link among financial development, growth and inequality.
Undernourishment (Claessens & Feijen, 2006) , population with lower income (Beck et al.,2007) decrease with financial development. One particular interesting characteristic in this category is the debate on the benefits of financial development. Some proponents asserts that financial imperfections such as information and transaction costs are binding on the poor(who lack collaterals and credit histories) and thus a relaxation of these credit constraints will disproportionately benefit the poor. It follows that improvement of capital allocation efficiency would reduce income-inequality by facilitating funding to poor individuals with productive investment ( Galor & Zeira, 1993; Aghion & Bolton, 1997; Galor & Moay, 2004) . In contrasts, some theories postulate that financial development primarily helps the rich. In a non linear relationship between finance, income-inequality and economic growth developed by Greenwood and Javanovic(1990) financial development does not benefit the poor at the tender stage of development.
In the second strand we find literature that addresses unequal access to and usage of finance. Whereas in developed countries, more than 90% of households have access to financial services, access to retail banking services is minimal in the poorer segments of the population in undeveloped countries, with fewer than one-quarter of households having access to even basic banking services (Honohan,2006) . Low usage in lower income countries derives in part from low banking sector outreach. As regards the second dimension of this strand(access to finance), it is important here to distinguish between financial depth and access to finance. As pointed out by Claessens & Perotti (2007) , numbers on the size of loans and deposits per capita are substantially higher in lower income countries than in their higher income counterparts. The higher average loan and deposit values in lower income countries suggest that usage of formal banking services is limited to firms and the relatively rich households.
In the third strand, we find papers on the effects of inequality in access to finance.
Absence of equal opportunities in access to finance may result in corruption (Berger & Udell,1998) , slower firm growth (Ayyagari et al.,2006; Beck et al.,2005) , reduction in entrepreneurial activities and lack of convergence in growth rates between rich and poor countries (Banerjee & Duflo, 2005) , diminish individual welfare gains such as reduction in the prevalence of hunger, poor health, low education and gender inequality (Claessens & Feijen, 2007) .
We have analyzed available evidence that financial access is quite skewed and affects competition, individual welfare and enterprise growth. The absence of diffused access can undermine growth, reduce welfare and create vulnerability to financial meltdown. It may be interesting to investigate why financial sector reforms have not been targeted at improving access to financing. The second category of the literature investigates this concern with natural and political views.
Why inequality in access to finance?
Hitherto, we have seen that financial systems provide unequal access to households and firms. For the purpose of clarity, motives for unequal access to finance could be naturally economic or due to political influences.
Natural economic reasons like natural high fixed cost in offering financial services or walls created by entry regulations that serve a valid public good(e.g. identification requirements for opening up a bank account to maintain financial integrity). It is due to financial market frictions that the poor cannot invest in their education despite their high marginal productivity of investment (Galor & Zeira, 1993; Banerjee & Newman, 1993) .
Unequal access can also results from political influence which creates regulatory obstacles to protect established rents ( Rajan & Zingales, 2003; Acemoglu et al.,2005) . This implies countries with poor political institutions, naturally leads to unequal political influence.
Powerful groups will impact the regulatory and judicial environment and frequently control the allocation of finance(directly via bank ownership or through political networking).
The experience and lessons of financial reform
For clarity of purpose it is worthwhile classifying literature on financial reform (in the context of inequality and resulting lessons) into three main strands.
In the first strand, we find studies focused on the timing and experience of financial liberalization in developing and developed countries over the past two decades (Henry,2003; Chinn & Ito,2006) . We find evidence especially at individual firm level, that domestic deregulation and liberalization have augmented the supply of domestic capital, attracted foreign capital, led to more relaxed financial constraints…etc. All these have led to increased investment and growth. Capital market liberalization specifically has been found to averagely have appealing effects on growth, asset allocation and efficiency (Levine and Zervros,1996; Henry,2000a; Henry,2000b; Henry,2006) .
The second strand focuses on literature pertaining to asset allocation, rents, and growth opportunities. Here-in, we find works substantiating that, reforms often benefit insiders through preferential allocation of assets, rents and growth opportunities. The cases of Chile in the 1970s (Velasco, 1988; Valdes-Prieto,1992) , Mexico in the 1980s (Haber & Kantor, 2004; La Porta et al.,2003; Haber et al.,2003) and Russia in the 1990s ( Claessens & Pohl,1995; Perotti, 2002) point to the fact that privatization of state owned banks benefit groups of insiders. We also find evidence of preferential allocation of licenses to a few insiders (Clarke et al.,2003) , benefits of stock market liberalization that have been directed only to the top quintile of the income distribution (Das and Mohapatra,2003) , listing and corporate governance rules often designed to help insiders (Khwaja & Mian, 2005) and last but not the least, poor regulation and weak enforcement in the liberalization markets allowed insiders ample space for the expropriation of minority shareholders (La Porta et al.,2000; Claessens et al.,2002) . In this strand we also find evidence that, while financial openness generally improves capital allocation and investment at the micro level (Henry,2003) ,it does not necessarily translate into higher economic growth at the aggregate level.
In the third strand, we find literature on allocation of risks created by financial reforms.
Bank crises can be socialized (Dooley,2000) and typically increase inequality (Galbraith & Lu, 1999) . Financial crises also benefit the lower-income strata through looting by the poor who have nothing to lose (Akerlof & Romer, 1993) . In the redistributive impact of crisis through politics, Glaeser et al.(2003) argue that in many countries, the political response to institutional subversion by the rich is not institutional reform, but rather a form of massive Robin Hood redistribution. In some cases, this backlash slows economic and social progress on the one hand and on the other hand, the effect could simply be a change in the elite. In many cases reforms are often opportunistic, geared towards political ends especially during elections (Dinc,2004; Brown & Dinc,2004) .
Finance and Inequality in Africa
Studies on the finance-inequality nexus are relatively absent in the context of Africa owing to scarcity and lack of relevant data on inequality. In a first detailed econometric analysis, Kai and Hamori(2009) As we must have emphasized earlier the main contributions of this paper to the finance and economic literature are the following: (1)an assessment of why income-inequality in Africa has remained stubbornly high, in spite of more than two decades of economic and financial reforms; (2) contrary to mainstream finance-growth literature 1 this work improves the employment of financial indicators by using financial intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size in the assessment of the impact finance on income-inequality; (3) we innovate the inequality-finance literature by introducing an investment dimension into the debate, where-in the income-finance nexus is contingent on aggregate domestic, foreign, private and public investment dynamics.
The following testable hypotheses will guide the empirical section of the paper.
Hypothesis 1 : Financial depth is good for the poor. Hypothesis 4 : Financial size decreases income-inequality.
Data and Methodology
Data
We examine a sample of 13 African countries(Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Egypt, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Uganda) with data obtained from African Development Indicators(ADI) and the Financial Development 1 This is the first empirical study to investigate the finance-inequality nexus with financial intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. In an African context, while Kai and Hamori(2009) use only financial depth, Batuo et al.(2010) use both financial depth and financial activity. To these variables we introduce alternative indicators of financial depth and financial activity for robustness purposes on the one hand, and on the other hand further our analysis with other dynamics of financial development(banking efficiency, financial efficiency, and financial size).
2 Some proponents in the literature assert that financial imperfections such as information and transaction cost are binding on the poor(who lack collateral and credit histories) and thus a relaxation of these credit constraints will disproportionately benefit the poor. It follows that improvement of capital allocation efficiency would reduce income-inequality by facilitating funding to poor individuals with productive investment ( Galor & Zeira, 1993; Aghion & Bolton, 1997; Galor & Moay, 2004). and Structure Database(FDSD) of the World Bank(WB). Owing to scares inequality data for the African continent from WDI, we borrow from Kai and Hamori (2009) 
Financial development indicators a) Financial depth
While recent finance-inequality literature has either not used financial depth (Beck et al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007) or focused only on a single measure of finance ( Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al.,2010) , we borrow from Beck et al.(1999) and Asongu(2011a) and proxy for financial depth both from overall-economic and financial system perspectives by indicators of broad money supply (M2/GDP) and financial system deposits (Fdgdp) respectively. While the first represents the monetary base plus demand, saving and time deposits, the second denotes liquid liabilities. The two variables are in ratios of GDP(see Appendix 3) and should robustly check each other as either accounts for over 97% of information in the other (see Appendix 2).
b) Financial efficiency
The concept of efficiency here is neither profitability-oriented nor guided by the production efficiency of decision making units in the financial sector (via Data Envelopment Analysis: DEA). What this paper is concerned with is the ability of banks to effectively fulfill their fundamental role of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators. We use measures for banking-system-efficiency and financial-system-efficiency (respectively 'bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd' and 'financial system credit on financial system deposits: Fcfd').
Like in the case of financial depth, these two financial allocation(intermediation) efficiency proxies can check each other as they represent more than 88% of variability in one another (see Appendix 2).
c) Financial size
Consistent with the FDSD we measure financial intermediary size as the ratio of "deposit bank assets" to the "total assets" (deposit bank assets on central bank assets plus deposit bank assets: Dbacba). Unfortunately, we could not find another indicator of financial size despite a thorough search, numerous computations and deepened correlation analyses.
d) Financial activity
Financial intermediary activity here refers to the ability of banks to grant credit to economic operators: consistent with some motives of financial reforms which sought to stimulate investment. While past works highlighted in the literature have focused only on a single measure (Beck et al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007; Batuo et al.,2010) we proxy for both bank-sectoractivity and financial-sector-activity with "private domestic credit by deposit banks: Pcrb" and "private credit by domestic banks and other financial institutions: Pcrbof" respectively. The later indicator checks the former as it represents more than 91% of information in the former (see Appendix 2).
Investment instrumental variables
The paper uses Gross Domestic Investment, Foreign Direct Investment, Gross Public Investment and Gross Private Investment as instrumental variables. The choice of these instrumental variables is premised on the finance-inequality literature, where-in financial reforms were investment-targeted.
Control Variables
In line with the finance-growth (Levine & King, 1993; Hassan et al., 2011) and financeinequality (Dollar & Kraay, ; Beck et al.,2007; Kai and Hamori, 2009 ) literature, we control for trade, inflation, population growth, government expenditure and GDP growth.
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis are represented in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 respectively. From the descriptive statistics, it could be noted that an estimation approach that directly assumes a particular form of distribution is inappropriate and would produce biased and inconsistent estimates. As for the correlation analysis, it has two main objectives. On the one hand it enables us avoid issues linked to multicolinearity and overparametization. On the other hand, it provides us with a foresight on possible linkage-signs between various indicators. Among them, it is worth noting that all correlations with the variable of interest have the right signs. While inflation and population growth are positively correlated with inequality, the remaining variables are negatively correlated with it. These negative relations are consistent with theory in the perspective that aggregate investment(domestic, foreign, private and public) measures designed to improve services in the financial sector(depth, efficiency, activity and size), and control variables(trade and government expenditure) all have an appealing redistributive impact on household income. As for inflation and population growth, they decrease purchasing power and household income per capita respectively; in line with their positive association with the variable of interest.
Methodology
Endogeneity
Though the lack of financial access has long been recognized as the leading cause of persisting inequality, Claessens & Perotti(2007) have urged the need to recognize the reverse effect as well. They borrow from Acemoglu & Robison (2005) in highlighting that inequality affects financial development and in particular the distribution of access, because unequal access to resources affects de facto political power. Consistent with the literature ( Rajan & Zingales,2003; and Perotti & Volpin, 2007) in a weak institutional framework where de facto political influence dominates de jure political representation, inequality renders it easy for established interests to influence access to finance by direct control or regulatory 'kidnapping' of the financial system.
Estimation technique
Borrowing from Beck et al.(2003) Thus our methodology will include the following models:
First-stage regression:
Second-stage regression:
In the two equations, X is a set of exogenous variables that are included in first-stage regressions. For the first and second equations, v and u, respectively denote the error terms.
Instrumental variables are the four aggregate investment variables.
Robustness of results
To assess the robustness of our results we: (1) use Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent(HAC) standard error regressions in every model; (2) control for the consistency of financial channels with alternative indicators; (3) check restricted with unrestricted regressions at the Second-stage of the TSLS approach.
Empirical Analysis
This section presents the results from cross-country regressions to assess the importance of aggregate investment dynamics in the effectiveness of financial channels and the ability of the exogenous components of financial channels to explain cross-country differences in incomeinequality conditional on investment dynamics(instruments).
Finance and Investment
In Table 1 , we regress the financial indicators on domestic, foreign, private and public investments conditional on control variables and also test for their joint significance. It is worth noting this is the first-step of the TSLS approach where-in, the instruments must explain the endogenous components of the financial channels, conditional on other covariates(control variables). After controlling for trade, inflation, population growth, general government expenditure and GDP growth, we find that investment dynamics enter jointly significantly in all regressions at the 1% level. This Fisher test results also reflect the strength of our instruments. We avoid introducing domestic and private investments in the same regression because both reflect the same information or variability at the height of over 58%. Table 2 addresses two main issues: (1) the concern of whether the exogenous components of financial channels explain inequality conditional on investment dynamics and; (2) whether only the exogenous components of financial channels explain inequality conditional on aggregate investment dynamics. In other words, the second concern seeks to assess if the income-redistributive impact of investment goes beyond financial channels. To make these assessments we use the TSLS regressions with investment instrumental variables . Thus we integrate equation (2) (Model 7, 7*, 8, & 8*) shows that all financial intermediary dynamics under consideration address the first issue. With regard to the second concern, rejection of the null hypothesis of the OIR test in all eight regressions demonstrates that not only financial channels explain income-inequality conditional on investment aggregates. In other words, investment dynamics exert an influence on inequality through other mechanisms beyond financial channels. We have found that the instruments are correlated with the error term in the equation of interest; implying investment dynamics do not address the issue of endogeneity (which the financial channels suffer-from). The presence of biased estimates owing to endogeneity could further be confirmed by the signs of estimated coefficients. At least judging from empirical literature, we expected negative signs for the financial depth channel (Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al.,2010) ; as is the case of financial activity (Beck et al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007; Batuo et al.,2010) . As for financial efficiency and size, we cannot establish with certainty which sign is right as this paper is the first to use them in finance-inequality literature.
Control Variables
Trade --- --- --- --- --- --- 0
Inequality and Finance
However, borrowing from initial correlation analysis we expected their corresponding estimates to display negative signs. Given the invalidity of the instruments, biased estimated coefficients and absence of additional financial channels to consider, we relax the restricted assumption of the TSLS approach in Table 2 and assume the presence of a(an) constant(autonomous) finance:
hence an unrestricted TSLS approach captured in Table 3 . p-values. Cragg-Donald Weak Instrument test. *, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Dbacba: Deposit bank assets on Central bank assets plus Deposit bank assets. Models with the "*" are in Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent standard errors(HAC). Consistent with the analytical approach expressed for Table 2, Table 3 addresses the two main issues. Firstly, rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman test in all eight regressions validates the TSLS estimation technique. While the significance of estimated coefficients address the first issue, the second concern is fully addressed by the OIR test. Failure to reject the null hypothesis in all eight regressions shows that only financial channels(in the presence of constant) explain the redistributive effect of income conditional on aggregate investment dynamics. In plainer terms, investment contributes to explaining income inequality through no other mechanisms than financial channels. This confirms the instruments are valid and the issue of endogeneity is no longer relevant as the investment dynamics are not correlated with the error term in the unrestricted equation of interest. The signs of estimated coefficients are those expected and in accordance with the literature: financial depth (Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al.,2010) and financial activity (Beck et al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007; Batuo et al.,2010) . As for others financial parameters, while those corresponding to financial size are insignificant at the 10% level, financial efficiency substantially increases household income-inequality. An in-depth account of this new finding in the finance-inequality literature is covered as we revisit tested hypothesis below.
In revisiting the hypotheses we can assert the following. (1) Financial depth is good for the poor, in line with theoretical (Galor & Zeira,1993; Banerjee & Newman,1993) and empirical (Beck et al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al.,2010) literature. We therefore confirm Hypothesis 1. (2) Financial allocation efficiency has a disequalizing effect on income-distribution; implying policies designed to improve the allocation of mobilized funds to economic agents only benefit the rich to the detriment of the poor. Thus this finding confirms the Greenwood and Javanovic(1990) inverted U-shape hypothesis owing to the relatively underdeveloped state of most countries in the sample. Drawing from Claessens & Perotti(2007) , this disequalizing effect could be understood from the numbers on the size of loans and deposits per capita; which are substantially higher in lower income countries than in their higher income counterparts. This suggests higher average loans and deposit values benefit only the wealthy and firms for the most part. In other words, formal banking services are limited to firms and relatively rich households of countries in the sample. This finding also supports Asongu(2011c) who postulates that financial allocation efficiency significantly undermines inequality adjustedwelfare in the African continent. We therefore reject Hypothesis 2. (3) Financial activity helps the poor. We confirm Hypothesis 3, that is consistent with theoretical (Galor & Zeira,1993; Banerjee & Newman,1993) and empirical (Beck et al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007; Batuo et al.,2010) literature. (4) The fourth hypothesis is that financial size helps the poor. The estimated coefficients are insignificant with the wrong signs. Therefore we conclude that financial size is not significantly antipoor.
Conclusion
Owing to the lack of data on income-inequality for Africa, there are presently only two studies dedicated to the continent in the finance-inequality literature (Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al.,2010) . While these papers have limited their analysis to few financial development indicators, the present work has contributed to this literature by integrating previously missing financial and investment components in the nexus. The results broadly indicate financial development does not help the poor from all dimensions. While financial channels of depth and activity are good for the poor as they diminish estimated household inequality, financial intermediary allocation efficiency increases it. The findings on financial depth and activity are broadly consistent with empirical (Beck et al.,2004; Beck et al.,2007; Kai & Hamori, 2009; Batuo et al.,2010) and theoretical (Galor & Zeira,1993; Banerjee & Newman,1993) literature which postulate a negative and linear relationship between financial development and incomeinequality. On the other hand findings of financial efficiency are in line the Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) inverted U-shaped hypothesis since most countries in the sample are still undeveloped.
As a policy implication, not all financial intermediary development dynamics are pro-poor.
Thus financial sector reforms aimed at curbing poverty and income-inequality should focus on financial channels that matter in the development context. 
Appendices
